Epstein's Challenge to the Civil Rights
Regime

W.B. ALLEN*

Every defender of the civil rights regime should read Richard
Epstein's Forbidden Grounds.' Hard as it may be to concede, this
book-length treatment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(and its subsequent legal adaptations) for the first time drives the
analysis to the root condition, the antidiscrimination principle itself.
In doing so Epstein provides a more than plausible case for a reconsideration, for he proves that the American legal order has not heretofore challenged itself to articulate clearly the full social meaning of
the antidiscrimination principle.
"Simple justice" simply conveys this meaning inadequately, for
antidiscrimination in principle goes far beyond anything justice demands. In the most obvious case justice can reach no farther than
the claims of individuals, however remote or numerous, while the
antidiscrimination principle abstracts from persons altogether and
deals most comfortably with broad ascriptions - the broader the
better - in a way entirely unsuited to judging just claims. This conundrum leads Epstein towards an abandonment of the antidiscrimination principle. One may question, however, whether the
principle were ever rightly conceived as a means to adjudicate just
claims. Epstein raises the last question but fails to see that a negative response does not entail a negative response to the question of
whether the antidiscrimination principle has any role to play in a
free political order.
The answer to this question, in turn, leads one to discover in the
antidiscrimination principle a new version of the theory of limited
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government - i.e., the principle serves to address the historical dilemmas of race and gender discrimination in our society only to the
extent that it serves to deny to government these specific means of
regulating or adjudicating claims of justice.2 Thus, the antidiscrimination principle is properly the limit condition rather than the
causa efficiens of a properly established civil rights regime.
Historically, the extension of civil rights protections for individuals
from state actions to private actions may seem to belie the claim that
the antidiscrimination principle is a form or element of limited government theory. The truly great growth of government power in the
realm of civil rights has certainly come in the form of enforcing antidiscrimination standards against private actors. The practical conversion of these standards into "thou shalt not" addressed to persons
whether public or private rather than into "government shall make
no laws" long since carried the day. This begs the question, however,
whether the conversion operated sozein ta phainomena (to save the
phenomena or appearances). A similar conversion bedevils the very
clear example of First Amendment speech protections, however. Justice Black's First Amendment absolutism yielded ultimately to lemming equivocation, and debates today turn far more usually on
questions of whether and how persons, public or private, may speak
or pray than on questions of whether and how government may decide such questions. When freedom of speech is viewed as a limit
condition, the result is not that anyone may speak or pray unimpeded but only that government may not do the impeding. Conversely, when freedom of speech is viewed as a title to speak or pray,
the result is that one may speak or pray only insofar as government
confirms the title. The one view limits government's power to decide;
the other empowers government to decide. When antidiscrimination
is viewed as a limit condition, the result is not that anyone can be
prevented from discriminating but only that government may in no
way do the discriminating. Conversely, when antidiscrimination is
viewed as a title to be free of discrimination, the result is that one
may enjoy the freedom only insofar as government confirms the title.
The one view limits government's power to decide, while the other
substitutes the government's decision as the only substantive meaning of nondiscrimination.
2. In fairness to Epstein, one must acknowledge that he approached this view of
the problem in the essay which anticipates Forbidden*Grounds, Two Conceptions of
Civil Rights, in REASSESSING CIVIL RIGHTS 38-59 (Ellen Paul et al., eds., 1991). There,
Epstein argued that a "libertarian conception" of civil rights could be contrasted with the
more recent, antidiscrimination version of civil rights. His libertarian or "individual"
conception of civil rights approaches but is not quite the same as the "limited government" concept employed here. Epstein did not repeat this contrast in the same forceful
terms in his book-length discussion, perhaps because he could discern difficulties in the
oversimplification caused by the contrast as he had made it originally.
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Let us look more closely at the government's determination of the
substantive meaning of nondiscrimination to better evaluate the relation between the current practice of the civil rights regime and, on
the one hand, the alternative suggested by Epstein and, on the other
hand, the social consequences of the limit condition view.
The most distinct expression of the legal and political determination of nondiscrimination is the theory of disparate impact. According to this theory, discrimination exists within relevant population
subgroups if and only if these groups are heterogeneously constructed and the statistical relations of their component elements
vary from predetermined reference norms without reference to explicitly formulated exceptions. 3 From this general theory at least two
general consequences follow: (1) no discrimination by race or gender
can occur within homogeneous sub-groups, and, (2) no discrimination occurs within heterogeneous groups that are balanced in regard
to the reference norms. 4 (This is a thought experiment which by no
means denies the existence of disparate treatment or special case
analysis.)
When we apply this general theory to a particular case, we obtain
an interesting result, namely, that in an officially nondiscriminating
environment it is likely, if not necessary, for excluded members of
protected groups to suffer unofficial but very real discrimination. The
test case is by no means imaginary, having been supplied in the form
of a table proudly submitted to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
by the Kentucky State Commission on Human Rights in evidence of
the success of Kentucky's then recently-imposed affirmative action
plan.

3. This general and abstract statement, I submit, covers every conceivable qualification relative to work forces and "qualified" work forces any court either has or can
dream up.
4. This means, obviously, that within a group defined by race, discrimination by
gender can occur and vice versa, but discrimination by gender within a group defined by
gender cannot occur, and so on.
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Inspecting the fourth row in the Table, the reader will perceive at
once that population ratio for black people in the State operates as
an ironclad quota (4 years running), meaning that neither more nor
fewer blacks will be retained in the State government's work force
than called for by the quota! A figure that grew from 5.8 % to 7.2 %
in just 6 years remained throughout the succeeding 3 years firmly
fixed at 7.3 %. What is the probability against something like that
happening randomly, out of a work force of nearly 40,000 people?
something greater by several times than the odds against intelligent life elsewhere in the universe!5
Incidentally, the fact that the Kentucky State Commission on
Human Rights might proudly proclaim these results as evidence of
their compliance with Title VII, and that the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights might approvingly receive it, is more than sufficient evidence that quotas enjoy a high level of approval under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. It is likely, however, that that approval depends
utterly on the false impression created by the almost universal testimony against quotas.
Thus, the black people who are not already employed in the Kentucky State work force - the excluded members of the protected
group - are subjected to approved discrimination. To that degree, it
is black folk, not white males, who bear the burden of quotas. This is
no surprise. Modest historical sensitivity reveals the necessity. Beginning in slavery and continuing long thereafter, black folk participated in the labor pool at rates far exceeding other subpopulations.
Thus, where a rate of 500 or 600 per thousand population would
have been high for the average group, a rate approaching 900 per
thousand population would have been normal for black folk. In recent years the spread between black folk and others diminished, but
it is unlikely that parity has been reached. Accordingly, a quota
based on general population ratios, as in Kentucky, actually represents a net loss of jobs for black folk. This job loss is principally in
unskilled and blue collar fields, and that helps explain the persistent
high unemployment in those areas (and the corollary of welfare subsistence). That was the original protection for labor unions. It also
explains the general impression of a displacement of white workers,

5. For a discussion of the Kentucky report, see REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS WILLIAM B. ALLEN, CARL A. ANDERSON, AND RUSSELL G. REDENBAUGH, 8190 (1990).

for that does occur in white collar fields where blacks had been minimally employed. Thus, hiring to a general population level in blue
and white collar jobs, while still falling short of historical labor patterns, explains both apparent improvements and high unemployment
resulting from discrimination. Reinforce the effect by means of black
competition with white women, hispanics, and others, and one has
the real picture of the quota regime sponsored by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964: nothing more than a regulated version of the open discrimination proposed by Epstein in Forbidden Grounds.
How would a civil rights regime . la Epstein deal with these same
facts? According to Epstein, repeal of Title VII would operate as to
private parties but not public agencies. In a freedom of contract regime, "Only where the state acts as an employer are there substantive limitations on the kinds of contracts that can be formed."' It is
unclear in his analysis whether theories such as disparate impact
may yet be applied in this slimmed-down version of the civil rights
regime. If the answer is yes, one could still obtain the Kentucky result.7 If the answer is no, one is at a loss to explain how the protections would operate, unless Epstein confines them to tortious actions
against government. His discussion in chapter 20 is equivocal,
though he does argue that
[i]nsisting on some racial balance in public employment need not be a cynical way to institute rigid quotas .... It helps build legitimacy ....
Race, religion, and national origin are useful proxies .... Within vast
portions of the public sphere, there will be some carryover of the arguments
for rational discrimination along racial or sexual lines.8

If government agencies, including many public universities, would
look much the same - and perhaps even more - under an Epstein
civil rights regime, the real question raised by his analysis must be
as to its effect in the private market. Even here, however, there are
theoretical difficulties which require close examination. Among these
none is more important than the fact that for Epstein a freedom of
contract regime is one in which the claims of contract are enforced
by the state. His proposal for a repeal of Title VII, accordingly, is
actually a proposal to establish secure public protection for discriminatory contracts. It is not, then, the putatively negative proposition
("repeal the Civil Rights Act") but the daringly positive, proactive
proposition, that society should give discrimination the force of law,
that deserves closest attention.
Without responding to this wider debate which I have now opened,
6. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 4. It is at least logically incorrect, parenthetically, to
say that an unprotected contract is therefore a "forbidden contract."
7. He reasonably excludes voluntary affirmative action by government, leaving
quotas as the likeliest substantive limitation if tort remedies are not invoked. EPSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 9.
8. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 424-25.
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I can nonetheless demonstrate the implications of Epstein's position.
For I have earlier argued that we should substitute for the world of
disparate impact a rigorous application of "state action" theory, including within the concept the action of the court.9 As Epstein acknowledges the propriety of society refusing to lend its authority to
the claims of illicit contracts, such as the contract to murder, I do
not need to defend the proposition that the state may legitimately
withdraw its protection from certain forms of contract. Accordingly,
one needs only to demonstrate that agreements to engage in invidious discrimination qualify as unprotected contracts to pose an alternative, not only to the civil rights but also to Epstein's version of the
freedom of contract regime. Interestingly, the version I have proposed is also a freedom of contract regime, for it maintains that society is better positioned to rely upon freedom of contract once it has
made clear what are and what are not acceptable contracts.
As I argued in Runyon, a rigorous application of state action theory not only clears up the problem of discrimination within the private market (by subjecting it squarely to market discipline without
an opportunity for public subsidy) but next establishes a forthright
prohibition in the public realm, which is far the more important of
the two. The argument was straightforward:
[I]t is unjust to empower one private individual to force another private
individual into a contractual relation against the latter's will. That, however, is a misapplication of Runyon and is not its essence, Justice White's
view notwithstanding . . . [it is] essential . . . to bar private or public
third-party interference in the right to make contracts. That is the legitimate civil right at which section 1981 was aimed. Congress meant to spell
out limits to contracts and to confine their obligations to the contracting
parties, as well as to protect entrepreneurial freedom, which alone renders
the right of contract meaningful. .o

The key to this argument was the fact that it does not create a basis
for government to coerce unwilling offerors to enter into contracts.
Its greatest force, through denial of enforcement, is to undermine
contracts which seek to bear on third parties invidiously, insofar as
such cartel-like arrangements cannot survive without tacit public
subsidy. On the other hand, private, two-party agreements (logically
speaking) may well be discriminatory and will remain effective for as
9. William B. Allen, Keynote Address: Let's Re-Do Runyon: Questions to Guide
Justice White, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 893 (1989) [hereinafter referred to in the text as
Runyon].

10. Id. at 896.

long as the parties maintain their motivation to sustain the agreement. 1 That such a result is possible is attested by the prevailing
racial characteristics of marriage. That a pervasive tendency in this
regard may nonetheless be altered by private dealing, secured
against meaningful third-party interference, is attested by the occurrence of intermarriage.
In the Kentucky test, the limited government freedom of contract
regime based on denying state sanction to all invidious discrimination would result in elimination of the official discrimination which
now results. For any individual could raise a meaningful objection to
public discrimination without it being sufficient to point to mere
numbers to rebut the allegation. Moreover, in private markets the
intrusive hand of government would be withdrawn precisely as Epstein wishes but without creating a state-sanctioned private discrimination.' 2 Rather, the general refusal to enforce discriminatory
contracts would operate in such a Niay as to bear most significantly
in the case where the social significance of the arrangement has
greater importance - where the scale is greater. "The private school
system would thus be opened because the cost of operating on unenforceable contracts would be too high, while the baby-sitting contract would never be called into question."' 13
Epstein's retort is not compelling, but it should be stated:
In some cases there may be a question of drawing the line as to whether
certain decisions have been made by the state or by private parties: a state
collective bargaining statute that confers on a union a legal monopoly is one
such example. But as a first approximation most businesses operate not
under the protection of a legal monopoly but only with the ordinary protections that are afforded by the law of property, contract, and tort. To say
that the receipt of these legal protections converts private decision into state
action does away with any distinction between state and private action, and
thus undermines the same legal regime of private rights that the Civil War
Amendments sought to protect."4

Beyond the fact that this argument carries a normative rather than
11. Here again, Epstein steps from certain principle to uncertain application:
"With freedom of contract, therefore, the legal system judges only those contractual offers that are made and accepted. Thereafter, competition within the economic system,
and not government fiat, determines which hiring strategy is superior." EPSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 290. In light of his reasonable attack on government-enforced segregation,
Epstein ought to be able to see that offering judicial protection for such practices while not overriding the market - steps onto that slippery slope which descends into
"political market" attempts to defend "legitimate" contracts against market discipline,
which is not only the real story of Jim Crow but perhaps of every significant form of
regulatory intervention into the market.
12. The defect of the restrictive covenant, which Epstein would allow, is that it
binds a contractee to a performance which can not be disciplined. Thus, in forming the
contract, the incentive to concede to a seller this evanescent utility is especially high,
since subsequently the seller cannot retain the advantage gained saved by undergoing the
opportunity costs and real costs of legal enforcement.
13. Allen, supra note 9, at 904.
14. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 131.
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an analytical force, it strikes me that it misses the point. For Epstein
has maintained that most deals in the private market are stable, not
requiring to be supported by the appeal to state enforcement or,
rather, not generally being called into question before state officers.
Hence, not every private act becomes state action even on the theory
he opposes! Only unstable private acts which can be resolved and
upheld only with recourse to state power and authority become state
acts. In that light, nothing can be more reasonable than for the society to consider in advance which kinds of instability it wishes the
state to invest its authority in settling and which it does not.15 That
is the very essence of limited government.
I believe this contrast in freedom of contract regimes to be far
more powerful than the contrast between Epstein's freedom of contract regime and the civil rights regime. The prevailing climate of
opinion, however, makes Epstein's move the more compelling, for he
accomplishes with it the needed reappraisal of the goals of the civil
rights regime. The book constitutes a challenge to defenders of the
civil rights regime to take up the one question they have consistently
refused to entertain - namely, what is the relation between a freedom of contract regime and a civil rights regime. In fact, the legitimacy of civil rights legislation will remain doubtful unless and until
an adequate response can be given to that question. In that sense,
Epstein has not undermined the civil rights regime so much as he
has demanded that it complete the construction of that edifice on the
only foundation that can enracinate it within the American political
order.
I have emphasized our differences on this subject, but these differences should not obscure the forthright agreement we share on what
is, perhaps, the most important sentence in Forbidden Grounds,
namely, that "[tihe refusal to deal for any reason lies at the root of a
system of a freedom of contract, itself the centerpiece of any common law order based on the autonomy principle."16 It is here that
defenders of the civil rights regime must engage Epstein's argument;
15. Whereas Epstein thinks it should make no difference to the state:
There is, moreover, no reason to take into account the so-called negative externalities of the practice [private preference/quota contract schemes], for with
ordinary two-party contracts the only externalities of any legal relevance are
the threat of force against strangers and the use of monopolistic practices, both
of which are as remote from affirmative action programs or quotas as from any
other form of employer choice.
EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 415.

16.

EPSTEIN,

supra note 1, at xii.

failing to do so will be to fail utterly either to defend or to transcend
the civil rights regime.

